Commonplaces from The Inner Citadel: The Meditations of Marcus Aurelius by Pierre Hadot

1: The Emperor-Philosopher

Marcus Aurelius learned from his teacher, Junius Rusticus, as Marcus himself tells us in his Meditations, "To study texts with precision, without being content just to skim over them in a general, approximate way; and not to give my assent too quickly to smooth talkers." 9-10

Cf. Alexander Pope's "Essay on Criticism"

"Learning is a good thing, even for one who is growing old. From Sextus the philosopher I shall learn what I do not yet know."

Marcus Aurelius 15

"... the Apologists' arguments ran as follows: Christianity is a philosophy--indeed the best of all philosophies. Therefore, a philosopher-emperor must tolerate it." 19

2: A First Glimpse of the Meditations

Leave your books alone. Don't let yourself be distracted any longer; you can't allow yourself that anymore (II, 2, 2). 31

Throw away your thirst for reading, so that when you die, you will not be grumbling, but will be in true serenity, thanking the gods from the bottom of your heart (II, 3, 3). 31

Let these thoughts be enough, if they are life-principles (dogmata) [δόγματά] for you (II, 3, 3). 31

Cf. "Let this be sufficient for you, these be continually your doctrines [δόγματά] (Aurelius and Farquharson 11).

Cf. "Let these reflections suffice thee, if thou hold them as principles [δόγματά]" (Aurelius and Haines 29).

Cf. "Let this be enough for you, and you constant doctrine [δόγματά]" (Aurelius and Hammond 11).

Cf. "Let these doctrines [δόγματά], if that is what they are, be enough for you" (Aurelius and Hard 11).

Cf. "That should be enough for you; treat it as an axiom [δόγματά]" (Aurelius and Hays 18).

Cf. "Let these thoughts set your mind at ease, and keep them as your guiding principles [δόγματά]" (Aurelius and Hicks 28).

Cf. "Let these thoughts suffise; let them be your maxims [δόγματά]" (Aurelius and Hutcheson 34),

Thus, the Meditations belong to that type of writing called hypomnemata [ύπομνήματα] in antiquity, which we could define as "personal notes taken on a day-to-day basis." 31-32

"...in order to support my memory [this is the etymological meaning of hypomnemata]". 32

For Augustine the writer's ego is no longer situated-- as is often the case with Marcus--at the level of Reason, exhorting the soul rather, Augustine's ego takes the place of the soul listening to Reason. 33

3: The Meditations as Spiritual Exercises

What is it that can escort you in order to protect you in this life? Only one thing: philosophy. It consists in keeping your inner god [δαίμονα] free from pollution and from damage (II, 17, 3). 35

Fight in order to remain as philosophy has wished you to be (VI, 30, 1-3). 35

The good man, however, will try, insofar as he is ale, to act justly in the service of other people, to accept serenely those events which do not depend on him, and to think with rectitude and veracity (VII, 54): 35

Αlways and everywhere, it depends on you piously to be satisfied with the present conjunction of events, (Hadot 35)

to conduct yourself justly toward whatever other people are present and

to apply the rules of discernment to the inner representation you are having now, so that nothing which is not objective may infiltrate its way into you.

Many of the Meditations present these three rules of life--or one or another of them--in a variety of forms (Hadot 36).

...universal formulas which Marcus, following Epictetus, calls dogmata [δόγματά] (Marcus Aurelius II, 3, 3; III, 13, 1; IV, 49, 6) 36

A dogma is a universal principle which founds and justifies a specific practical conduct, and which can be formulated in one or in several propositions. Our word "dogma," moreover, retained something of this meaning, for instance in Victor Hugo: "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity: these are dogmas of peace and of harmony. Why should we make them seem frightening?" (Hadot 36)

Marcus also employs the word theorema [θεώρημα] to designate the "dogmas" 37

...the Meditations--with the exception of Book I--are wholly made up of repeated, ever renewed formulations of three rules of action which we have just seen, and of the various dogmas which are their foundation

Marcus mentions "The large number of proofs by which it is demonstrated that the world is like a City," . . . (IV, 3, 5, 6). 37

We must, then, not only act in conformity with the theorems of the art of living, but also keep present to our consciousness the theoretical foundations which justify them. 42

This is why Marcus uses a third method of formulating dogmas. Here the technique involves reconstructing hr arguments used to justify them, or even reflecting upon the difficulties to witch they may give rise. For instance, Marcus alludes, without citing them, to all the proofs which demonstrate that the world is like a City (IV, 3, 5) . . . a city is a group of beings subject to the same laws. Now, the world is a group of beings subject to the same laws: the law of Reason. Therefore, the world is a City (IV, 4) (Hadot 42-43).

Cicero, On the Laws, I, 7, 33; I, 12, 33, carries out the same linkage between the idea of common law and that of the community among reasonable beings. 322

The three rules of life or disciplines

...practical conduct obeys three rules of life which determine the individual's relationship to the necessary course of Nature, to other people, and to his own thought. 43

The three rules of life or discipline correspond to the three activities of the soul: judgment, desire, and impulse; and to the three domains of reality: individual faculty of judgment, universal Nature, and human nature. This can be seen in the following diagram:

activity	domains of reality	inner attitude
(1) judgement	faculty of judgment	objectivity
(2) desire	universal Nature	consent to Destiny
(3) impulse toward action	human Nature	justice and altruism

We encounter this ternary model frequently throughout the Meditations. I shall cite a few important passages:

(VII, 54)

(IX, 6)

(VIII, 7) p. 44

(IX, 7)

(IV, 33, 3)

In addition to these explicit formulations, we find numerous allusions to the three principles in various forms . . . (XII, 15) . . . (III, 9, 2) . . . It sometimes happens that only two or even one of the disciplines appears . . . IV, 22

In X, 11, 3:

And again, in VIII, 23: p. 45

Often, only one theme is evoked, as for instance the discipline of desire (VII, 57):

or the discipline of judgment (IV, 7):

or, finally, the discipline of impulses (XII, 20): p. 46

The Meditations, then, take up the various dogmas one by one, either briefly or in more developed form, and different chapters give longer lists of them than others. Likewise, they tirelessly repeat, either concisely or in more extended form, the formulation of the three rules of life, which can be found gathered together in their entirety in certain chapters. As we shall see, Book III attempts to give a detailed, ideal portrait of the good man, and the three rules of life, which correspond precisely to the good man's behavior, are set forth in great detail. On the other hand, we can also find the three rules of life--mixed together with other related exhortations--presented in a form so concise that it makes them almost enigmatic: p. 46

(VII, 29) p. 47

These three disciplines of life are the true key to the Meditations of Marcus Aurelius, for the various dogmas I have discussed crystallize around them. The dogmas affirming our freedom of judgment, and the probability for mankind to criticize and modify his own thought, are linked to the discipline of judgment, while all the theorems on the causality of universal Nature are grouped around that discipline which directs our attitudes toward external events. Finally, the discipline of attraction is fed by all the theoretical propositions concerning the mutual attraction which unites rational beings.

In the last analysis, we realize that behind their apparent disorder, we can discern a highly rigorous conceptual system in Marcus' Meditations. I shall now turn to a detailed description of its structure.

Imaginative exercises

The Meditations do not just formulate the rules of life and the dogmas by which they are nourished; for it is not only reason which is exercised in them, but imagination as well. . . . (VIII, 31)

(IV, 32): p. 47

(VI, 47) . . . (VIII, 5) . . . (X, 31, 2)

(IV, 50; VI, 24: VII 19, 2; VI, 48; VIII, 25; VIII 37; IX, 30; XII 27)

Writing as a spiritual exercise

...variations on a small number of themes p. 48

(II, 11, 4)

(IV, 8)

(IV, 35)

(VIII, 21, 2)

(III, 11, 2)

(X, 11, 1)

VIII, 34 and XI, 8 p. 49

Marcus writes only in order to have the dogmas and rules of life always present in his mind. He is thus following the advice of Epictetus, who after having set forth the distinction between what does and does not depend on us--the fundamental dogma of Stoicism--adds:

(I, 1, 25)

(III. 24, 103)

The Stoic philosophical life consists essentially in mastering one's inner discourse. Everything in an individual's life depends on how he represents things to himself--in other words, how he tells them to himself in inner dialogue. . . . Therefore, one must constantly rekindle the "representations" (phantasiai) [φαντασίαι] within oneself, in other words, those discourses which formulate dogmas (VII, 2). p. 50

Cf. "Your principles are living principles. How else can they become lifeless, except the images [φαντασίαι] which tally with them be extinguished?" (Aurelius and Farquharson 56)

Cf. "How else can thy axioms be made dead than by the extinction of the ideas [φαντασίαι] that answer to them" (Aurelius and Haines 165)?

Cf. "Your principles are living things. How else could they be deadened, except by the extinction of the corresponding mental images [φαντασίαι] (Aurelius and Hammond 48)?

Cf. "Your principles have life in them. For how can they perish, unless the ideas [φαντασίαι] that correspond to them are extinguished" (Aurelius and Hard 58)?

Cf. "You cannot quench understanding unless you put out the insights [φαντασίαι] that compose it" (Aurelius and Hays 85).

Cf. "How can the general rules by which we live perish unless the particular circumstances [φαντασίαι] which they govern cease to be" (Aurelius and Hicks 77)?

Cf. "How can the grand maxims of life ever become dead in the souls, unless the opinions [φαντασίαι] suitable to them be extinguished" (Aurelius and Hutcheson 83)?

The task--ever renewed--is to bring back to order an inner discourse which becomes dispersed and diluted in the futility of routine. (Hadot 51)

"This was an exercise of writing day by day, ever-renewed, always taken up again and always needing to be taken up again, since the true philosopher is the who is conscious of not yet having attained wisdom" (Hadot 51).

"Greek" exercises

...Marcus was completely bilingual, having studied Greek rhetoric with Herodes Atticus and Latin rhetoric with Fronto. (Hadot 51)

Even in Rome, Greek was the language of philosophy. (Hadot 51)

One might have thought that Marcus would have preferred to talk to himself in Latin. . . . however, the Meditations are not spontaneous effusions, but exercises carried out in accordance with a program which Marcus had received from . . . Epictetus. (Hadot 52)

...philosophical material was associate with a technical vocabulary, and the Stoics, in particular.... Translators must, by the way, be aware of this peculiarity.... Such technicalities go to show that Marcus was no amateur... (Hadot 52)

It was difficult to translate these terms into Latin. It can be said that Lucretius, Cicero, and Seneca had done quite well... But the goal of these authors was popularization.... Marcus' project was different: he was writing for himself. To translate or to adapt terminology would distract him from his goal. What is more, if they were translated into Latin, the techincal terms of Greek philosophy would lose a part of their meaning. (Hadot 52)

4: The Philosopher-Slave and the Emperor-Philosopher

The death of the elements into one another--an eminently Heraclitean theme--could not fail to attract the Emperor's attention (IV, 46, 1); after all, Stoicism had accustomed him to meditate upon universal metamorphosis.

Together with Heraclitus, we find Empedocles, one of whose verses Marcus cites (XII, 3).

In the collection entitled "The Sentences of Democratus," sometimes attributed to Democritus, Marcus found an aphorism which, one could say, sums up his own thought (IV, 3, 11):

Elsewhere, (VII, 31, 4), Marcus criticizes another Democritean text... (Hadot 55)

Marcus also thinks he recognizes this doctrine [everything is in our representations] in the formula of a Cynic (II, 15):

As Monimus [the Cynic] said, it is usually precisely our vanity [all human opinion (to hypolephthen)--typhus in the sense of "emptiness," or "smoke," but also "pride"--which perverts out value-judgments (IV, 13): (Hadot 56)

We also find several Platonic texts in the Meditations, taken from the Apology (28b; 28-d), the Gorgias (512d-e), the Republic (486a), and the Theatetus (174d-e). . . . (VII, 44) . . . (VII, 45); (VII, 46) . . . (VII, 35) . . . (X, 23). What Marcus recognized in all these quotations was Stoicism, not Platonism. (Hadot 57)

Marcus also read a text by Theophrastus, the student of Aristotle, which . . . probably interested the judge in Marcus, responsible for assessing guilt, since it raises the questions of degrees of responsibility. According to Theophrastus, crimes committed with pleasure, and resulting from the attraction of pleasure, are more serious than those one is forced to commit because of that suffering caused by an injustice we have borne, which pushes us on to anger. Marcus approves of this theory (II, 10), and it has therefore been maintained that he was thereby unfaithful to Stoicism, since the Stoa held that all faults are equal. . . . Epictetus himself, for that matter, also appears to consider that certain faults are more easy to pardon than others (IV, 1, 147)....

Marcus also mentions the "Pythagoreans" . . . (XI, 27).

Epicurean maxims and passages from Epicurus are also to be found in the Meditations. Marcus rewrites them into a stoic vocabulary when he quotes them, and retains from them advice which a Stoic could legitimately practice . . . (VII, 27) . . . (VII, 33; VII, 64) . . . (XI, 26) . . . (IX, 41). (Hadot 58)

The teachings of Epictetus

Even Christians such as Origen, who wrote in the third century, speak of a Epictetus in terms of respect. 60

The word Encheiridion ("that which one has at hand") alludes to the requirement of the Stoic philosophical life--a requirement to which Marcus, too, had tried to respond by composing his Meditations. In every one of life's circumstances, it was necessary to have "at hand" the principles, "dogmas," rules of life, or formulas which would allow a person to place himself in the inner disposition most conducive to correct action, or to accept his fate. (Hadot 61)

This part of the class, then, which consisted of "reading" would become the lectio of the Middle Ages, and finally our "lesson." It made up the most essential part of Epictetus' teachings, but is completely absent from the Discourses of Epictetus. What they do preserve for us, however, is what could be termed the nontechnical part of the course. All philosophy courses--at least since the beginning of the first centuryA.D.--contained as an essential element the explanation of texts; yet they could also end in a moment of free discussion between the philosopher and his auditors (Hadot 63).

Quotations of Epictetus in the Meditations

pp. 66-68

The three rules of life or disciplines according to Epictetus

We have already seen the important role played in the Meditations by what I have called the triple rule of life , which proposes a discipline of representations or judgments, of desire, and of action. This very tripartition of the acts and functions of the soul, and the entire distinction between judgment, desire, and impulse, is a doctrine which is peculiar to Epictetus, and which is not found in Stoicism prior to him. Its presence in Marcus Aurelius is, nevertheless, unmistakable. In VIII, 7, for example, Marcus clearly draws an opposition between representations (phantasiai), desires (orexeis), and impulses toward action (hormai), and he does so again in VIII, 28:

Every judgement, every impulse to action, and every desire or aversion are within the soul, and nothing else can enter therein.

Cf. "...for every judgment, impulse, desire, or aversion is within, and nothing evil makes its way up to this" (Aurelius and Farquharson 72).

Cf. "For every conviction and impulse and desire and aversion is from within, and nothing climbs in thither" (Aurelius and Haines 211).

Cf. "Every judgment, every impulse, desire and rejection is within the soul, where nothing evil can penetrate" (Aurelius and Hammond 76).

Cf. "For every judgment, impulse, desire, or aversion arises from within us, and nothing evil can enter in from outside" (Aurelius and Hard 74).

Cf. "All our decisions, urges, desires, aversions lie within. No evil can touch them" (Aurelius and Hays 106).

Cf. "Every judgment of this sort, every impulse to act, every desire and aversion comes from within; nothing bad can gain entrance without the mind's consent" (Aurelius and Hicks 96).

Cf. "All judgment, intention, desire, and aversion are within the soul; to which no evil can ascend" (Aurelius and Hutcheson 100).

We have already encountered a brief maxim which also makes use of the same schema:

Erase your representation (phantasia) [φαντασία], check your impulse to action (horme) [ὁρμή], extinguish your desire (orexis) [ὄρεξις]. Keep your directing principle (hegemonikon) [ἡγεμονικόν] within your power (IX, 7).

[Ἐξαλεῖψαι φαντασίαν: στῆσαι ὁρμήν: σβέσαι ὄρεξιν: ἐφ̓ἑαυτῷ ἔχειν τὸ ἡγεμονικόν.

Marcus Aurelius. M. Antonius Imperator Ad Se Ipsum. Jan Hendrik Leopold. in aedibus B. G. Teubneri. Leipzig. 1908. Keyboarding.]

Cf. "Wipe out imagination: check impulse: quench desire: keep the governing self in its own control" (Aurelius and Farquharson 82).

Cf. "Efface imagination. Restrain impulse. Quench desire. Keep the ruling Reason in thine own power" (Aurelius and Haines 237).

Cf. "Erase the print of imagination, stop impulse, quench desire: keep your directing mind its own master (Aurelius and Hammond 85).

Cf. "Blot out imagination; put a curb on impulse; quench desire; ensure that your ruling centre remains under its own control" (Aurelius and Hard 84).

Cf. "Blot out your imagination. Turn your desire to stone. Quench your appetites. Keep your mind centered on itself" (Aurelius and Hays 119).

Cf. "Blot out imagination; restrain impulse; stifle desire; give your reason the upper hand" (Aurelius and Hicks 10).

Cf. "Wipe out the fancies of imagination: stop all eager impulses to action: extinguish keen desires; and keep the governing part master of itself" (Aurelius and Hutcheson 109).

The three rules of life propose an askesis, or discipline, for these three acts of the soul. In the context of the cento of passages from Epictetus (XI , 3 3 -3 9) which we have already seen, Marcus himself cites an Epictetan passage which we know only through his intermediary (XI, 37):

5: The Stoicism of Epictetus

Conflicting modification on March 25, 2017 at 6:07:54 PM: